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There is an important history often neglected by genealogies of ‘critical 
whiteness studies’: Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness critique of white 
liberalism. What would it mean to retrieve this criticism in the context of 
white anti-racism in the post-apartheid era? Said’s (2003) contrapuntal 
method proves useful here as a juxtaposing device whereby the writings 
of a past figure can be critically harnessed, travelling across temporal and 
ideological boundaries to interrogate the present. Four interlinked modes 
of disingenuous white anti-racism can thus be identified: 1) a fetishistic 
preoccupation with disproving one’s racism; 2) ostentatious forms of 
antiracism that function as means of self-promotion, as paradoxical means 
of white self-love; 3) the consolidation and extension of agency through 
redemptive gestures of ‘heroic white antiracism’; 4) ‘charitable 
antiracism’ which fixes tolerance within a model of charity, as an act of 
generosity and that reiterates the status and role of an antiracist 
benefactor. 
 
Keywords: Biko; Black Consciousness; whiteness; anti-racism; post-
apartheid 
 
The name of Biko 
 
A name starts to function as a ‘master-signifier’ when, despite the predominance of a 
general ‘preferred meaning’ it is put to strategic use by diverse interest groups. This is 
not necessarily a situation to be avoided: such moments of hegemony indicate that a 
legacy is alive and well; that a given heritage, no matter how contested, has become a 
part of the popular imaginary of a given culture. Nonetheless, in such instances one is 
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justified in asking what routinely ‘falls out’ of the legacy in question, what particular 
elements – indeed, what discomforting aspects – are consistently removed by such 
processes of hegemonic assimilation.  
The name of Biko has become something of a master-signifier in South Africa 
today; it is touchstone for many instrumental uses; it acts as an emblem of credibility, 
as a marker of moral, political and cultural capital. This should perhaps come as no 
surprise. The 12
th
 of September 2007 of course marked the 30
th
 anniversary of Biko’s 
death at the hands of apartheid state’s security police. This date was marked by a 
resurgence of interest in Biko’s work and politics (Mngxitama, Alexander & Gibson, 
2008, Van Wyk, 2007). More than an icon of the anti-apartheid liberation struggle and 
of Black Consciousness thought in South Africa, the name of ‘Biko’ however now 
functions as a more encompassing signifier with a properly global range of 
associations. ‘Biko’ provides, amongst other things: the inspiration for the 
establishment of an ‘Afro Space [radio] Station’; the name of a variety of popular 
songs (by Bloc Party, Peter Gabriel and others); the name of a Brazilian research 
organization (the Steve Biko Institute, Salvador); the logo and image of a line of 
popular apparel (T-shirts, handbags); even the name of a fictional space-ship in Star 
Trek (the U.S.S. Biko). We have thus a situation akin to what Edward Said (2000) 
describes in his account of ‘travelling theory’: the inevitable dilution of revolutionary 
thought as it is transposed from one strategic context and value-system to another. 
The above set of examples leads us perhaps to the same conclusion, namely that such 
a diverse range of borrowings cannot but lead to a potential neutralization of the name 
in question. Thabo Mbeki’s (2009) comment that many latter-day admirers of Steve 
Biko ‘seek to redefine him by stripping him of his revolutionary credentials’ (p. 113) 
thus seems justified.  
Two possible objections arise in response to the attempt to retrieve Biko. 
Firstly, the gesture of designating the true use of a name is often itself an ideological 
operation, a means of appropriating the name to one’s own particular cause. This 
poses the question, to which I hope to return, of my own agenda in returning to Biko. 
Secondly, there is the contention that although the retrieval of Black Consciousness 
thought is all well and good – and consonant with calls to prioritize indigenous 
knowledge systems – it remains a historical task, cut off from more immediate and 
pressing social, economic and bio-political agendas of the post-apartheid present. This 
argument gives rise to a challenge: how might we productively retrieve aspects of 
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Biko’s Black Consciousness thought today, particularly so with a view to exploring 
issues of (anti)-racism today in the post-apartheid context? 
 
Contrapuntal reading and de-radicalization 
 
The revitalization of early critical or literary works is a favoured theme of Edward 
Said’s. As is well known, Said offers up the notion of the contrapuntal as a way of 
reading pertinent texts from a different era, as a means of disrupting the normative 
assumptions delimiting current conditions of understanding. It helps here to refer 
directly to Said’s (2003, p. 25) own account of his contrapuntal retrieval of the work 
of figures that he believes deserve to be read as intrinsically worthwhile still today: 
 
My approach tries to see them in their context as accurately as possible, but …I see them 
[also] contrapuntally…as figures whose writings travel across temporal, cultural and 
ideological boundaries in unforeseen ways… Thus later history reopens and challenges 
what seems to have been the finality of an earlier figure of thought, bringing it into 
contact with cultural, political and epistemological formations undreamed of by…its 
author… [T]he latencies in a prior figure or form [can]…suddenly illuminate the present. 
 
Our attempt in what follows should thus be to listen with a double-ear, to hear Biko 
not only obviously in terms of the time, the place and the context in which he wrote, 
but precisely as if what he wrote was also directed at the post-apartheid and 
postcolonial present.  
I may not be the best person to attempt such a contrapuntal re-reading of Biko. 
More than once I have been made aware, by students and colleagues, that my reading 
of Biko is perhaps necessarily skewed, distorted by my background, as if there is an 
epistemological break present in a given white South African’s reading of Biko’s 
essays. There are in fact two pitfalls here. Firstly, the danger of replicating precisely 
what Biko warns against, the liberal white subject’s re-representation of black 
critique, that is, the situation of me speaking for, or over Biko, of using him to my 
own ends. Secondly, and perhaps more insidiously, there is the prospect here of my 
own performative attempt – in expressing a fidelity to Biko – to demonstrate, to 
implicitly prove, my own non-racism. Neither of these are charges that I can fully 
exculpate myself from. As will become apparent as we continue, many of the 
critiques I go on to develop in this chapter pertain directly both to this chapter itself. 
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Said’s ideas on the contrapuntal go beyond the provision of a reading 
methodology. The contrapuntal is essentially a juxtaposing device whereby one 
overlaps – for aesthetic or political effect – two or more incompatible historical, 
textual, or musical themes. For Said (2003) it is more than just a means of generating 
a critical sensibility - it is also a way of apprehending overlapping ‘territories of 
experience’, especially so in the case of one who simultaneously occupies two 
radically different cultural worlds. Part of what is useful about this method, this mode 
of experience, is not just that it upsets the present, but also that it draws attention to 
the domestication of the past and the de-radicalization of certain figures.  
This is pertinent in the case of Biko, and in the case of many black resistance 
leaders. For example, a recent Associated Press Report, MLK's Legacy Is More Than 
His 'Dream' Speech, emphasizes how aspects of King’s less popular political 
commitments – his opposition to the Vietnam War, his insistence that poverty and 
militarism needed be considered part of the problem of US racism – have been filtered 
out of public memory. King of course is responsible for some of the most famous 
words in U.S. history: “I have a dream…”. The third Monday of each January in the 
U.S. is, furthermore, Martin Luther King Day, an extraordinary mark of 
commemoration. These remembrances of King stand in stark contrast to his declining 
popularity at the time of his death, to the oft-neglected fact of his radicalism in 
attacking the exploitative nature of racialized capitalism. What is my point here? In 
many instances the institutionalization of such a heroic figure occurs as part of a 
strategy of amnesia. This is a memorialization which works as a means of forgetting. 
We have a selective focussing-in on an isolated element which enables a wiping-out 
of a far more disconcerting ensemble of surrounding elements. After all, as Henry 
Taylor (2008) comments in the same report (MLK's Legacy Is More Than His 'Dream' 
Speech), how many people can recall what followed on in Martin Luther King’s most 
famous speech, what came after the words ‘I have a dream’…?  
 
The object which proves that it is not so 
 
In psychoanalysis there is a term which describes this operation – in which we see a 
great investment in a certain object or person taken out of a disturbing context, and 
that is then memorialized, instituted in a way that enables us to forget, in a manner 
that protects us from a far more threatening situation. We can treat the “I have a 
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dream” refrain, much like Martin Luther King Day itself, as a fetish. That is, they are 
a way of proving that something is not so. They are a way of proving for white 
America that it is somehow not racist, that a line has been drawn between itself and its 
racist past. This extraction of one given iconic figure, which occurs as a means of 
allowing a far more disconcerting context to be forgotten, is thus an exemplary case 
of how not to retrieve Biko.  
We are now well placed to identify one of the modes in which certain forms of 
white anti-racism run aground. I have in mind the desperate reiteration of one or two 
examples from one’s personal history that do the job of ostensibly proving one’s non-
racism.  We have thus a kind of selective aggrandizement of certain behaviours 
occurring in the face of something far harder, indeed, traumatic, to confront, such as 
the fact of one’s own complicity in racism. This is a fetishistic form of anti-racism 
which relies on some or other heroic and often-revisited object, activity or memory to 
do the job of proving something not to be the case. This, moreover, is never simply a 
private process, but is typically performed before a public of some or other sorts 
precisely as a means of ‘making a name’, gaining strategic advantage, of lending  an 
exceptional status to the person in question. Importantly of course, whereas minor 
instances of resistance against apartheid come to take on a heroic value in the case of 
whites, similar such infractions and resistances were simply part of the everyday life 
for black subjects under apartheid. 
 A brief example: I recently received a proposal for a PhD focussing on ‘the 
role of a new generation of students in the post-apartheid era in re-shaping the social 
dynamics of South Africa’. Now to be fair, it is not absolutely clear that the students 
in question are meant to be white students, so we should not leap in to criticize too 
quickly. Those familiar with Biko’s critique of white liberalism will however 
immediately grasp what is potentially problematic here. This example illustrates two 
tactics of white anti-racism which typically go together: firstly, an attempted 
demonstration of non-complicity; secondly, an instance of the re-centering of 
whiteness. It is useful here to refer directly to Biko, who suggests that such gestures 
show up the real underlying motivation of this sort of anti-racism: the attempt to 
portray an image of one’s self as non-racist. White liberals, he says (1978, p. 23)  
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waste lots of time in an internal sort of mudslinging designed to prove that A is more of a 
liberal than B…[They]…try to prove to as many blacks as they can find that they are 
liberal. 
 
Anticipating ‘critical whiteness studies’ 
 
It is this problem, the ‘re-centring of whiteness’ as it appears even in the critique of 
racism, that I want to focus on as we continue. It provides an answer to the question 
of how we might retrieve Biko today, that is, by returning to an element of his work 
often neglected: his critique of whiteness, what he terms ‘white liberal ideology’, or 
more directly yet, his attacks on certain forms of white anti-racism. My contention is 
that Biko’s critique of whiteness anticipates, and in some senses improves upon, many 
of the central arguments that would emerge in the later domain of ‘critical whiteness 
studies’. 
 A useful contemporary backdrop to our retrieval of Biko comes in the form of 
Sara Ahmed’s (2004) seminal paper Declarations of Whiteness. Her article provides a 
valuable means of orientation: it both introduces key moments in the history of 
whiteness studies and draws out many of the limitations of this area of scholarship. In 
response to the question of ‘why study whiteness?’, Ahmed (2004) offers the reply 
that it is a crucial component of anti-racism; it can make apparent insidious forms of 
white hegemony and emphasize aspects of white racism and privilege not otherwise 
brought into critical visibility. Of the multiple possible genealogies of whiteness 
studies we should, for Ahmed, opt for one which treats the work of black feminists as 
its starting-point, prioritizing thus the black critique of whiteness. Although in 
principle I agree, I would like to extend her proposed timeline, to try and demonstrate 
how Biko’s critique of whiteness contains in germinal form many of the arguments 
that would be explored by a later generation of authors. 
Ahmed (2004) opposes the black critique of whiteness to the more recent and 
fashionable studies by white academics (Frankenberg, 1993, Dyer, 1997) who like to 
emphasize how whiteness operates as invisible, as an implicit cultural norm or 
framing position. She is aware of how the study of whiteness may ultimately end up 
lending support to that which it had hoped to critique. The dangers here are easy 
enough to anticipate: one might end up ‘substantializing’ whiteness, re-centring it as a 
fixed category of experience, thus reifying it, lending it an essence (Fine, Powell, 
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Weis & Wong, 1997), treating it, as Garner (1997) cautions, not so much as a set of 
social relationships but as on object in itself. 
 What this means is that the project of showing up the ostensible invisibility of 
whiteness will not be enough, just as the attempt on the part of white academics to try 
and ‘step outside of whiteness’ cannot, in and of itself, be adequate. After all, as 
Ahmed (2004) repeatedly emphasizes, whiteness is only invisible to those who inhabit 
it; the very act of turning a critical gaze upon the whiteness can operate to place it 
once again centre-stage. As such something more unsettling, more genuinely 
destabilizing is required in the analysis of whiteness. 
 
White terror 
 
There are aspects of Biko’s writings which do target the normalizing factor of 
whiteness, attacking its role as a cultural bench-mark from which judgements of 
deviance, beauty and morality can be made. Black consciousness he says, seeks to 
undo the lie that ‘black is an aberration from the “normal” which is white’ (1978, p. 
100). This entails an awareness of how radically divergent material living conditions 
come to take on a psychological and moral value; coming thus to provide the basis for 
intuitive attributions of inferiority and superiority: 
 
…the Black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation. He…attaches the 
meaning White to all that is good… [This situation] arises out of living…it is part of the 
roots of self-negation which our kids get even as they grow up. The homes are different, 
the streets…so you tend to begin to feel that there is something incomplete in your 
humanity, and that completeness goes with whiteness. (pp. 100-101) 
 
Clearly these are not comments which risk reifying whiteness, or white experience; 
they maintain no redemptive end-point, no hope of tacitly reconsolidating white 
agency. We see in fact in Biko qualities of the trope of whiteness as terror which 
would prove so important for African-American authors such as bell hooks and Toni 
Morrison for whom the history of slavery and white supremacy is not easily forgotten. 
Whiteness is accordingly thus assigned the values of brutality, inhumanity and 
capricious violence: 
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There is such an obvious aura of immorality and naked cruelty in all that is done in the 
name of white people… in South Africa whiteness has always been associated with 
police brutality and intimidation…[with] general harassment… The claim by whites of a 
monopoly on comfort and security has always been so exclusive that blacks see whites as 
the major obstacle in their progress towards peace, prosperity and a sane society. 
Through its association with all these negative aspects, whiteness has thus been soiled 
beyond recognition. At best…blacks see whiteness as a concept that warrants being 
despised, hated, destroyed and replaced by an aspiration with more human content in it. 
(1978, p. 77) 
 
These are comments that a liberal white sensibility would prefer to forget; it is for this 
very reason important to dwell upon them. Biko’s thoughts introduce a discordant 
note into post-apartheid platitudes of the rainbow nation; they disturb the ideals of a 
liberal multicultural model of integration that systematically favours some over 
others.  
It is important to emphasize the contrapuntal reading method we have embarked 
on, so as to avoid the relief which, for some, may come from being able to claim some 
historical and geographical distance from what Biko is describing. A defensive 
response to Biko’s arguments would seek to qualify this whiteness as apartheid 
whiteness, the inhumanity in question as essentially that of the oppressions of the 
apartheid state. The problem here is that Biko (1978, p. 76) is speaking not only of the 
physical oppression of explicit forms of violence, but also of the structural 
oppressions resulting from capitalist modes of dominance that have historically 
allowed whites to maintain ‘a monopoly on comfort and security’. His words thus 
clearly have relevance beyond the realm of state-sponsored racist violence, beyond 
the historical era of apartheid.  
Perhaps the most predictable retort to Biko would be to argue that ‘whiteness’ 
itself is not a viable category of analysis because it is unwieldy, lacking in 
differentiation. This is something Biko anticipates; defensive recourse to the 
ostensibly heterogeneous nature of white society is, for him, part of the problem. ‘It 
may perhaps surprise some people’, he writes ‘that I should talk of whites in a 
collective sense’, nonetheless  
 
[b]asically the South African white community is a homogeneous community. It is a 
community of people who sit to enjoy a privileged position that they do not deserve, are 
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aware of this, and therefore spend their time trying to justify why they are doing so. 
(1978, p. 19) 
 
Read within the context of his time, or of ours, Biko’s arguments offers whites no 
distance from whiteness, no possibility of dis-identification. One might contend that 
there is a necessary wounding of the narcissism of whiteness at work here. He (1978, 
p. 66) insists that  
 
[Whites] are born into privilege and are nourished and nurtured in the system of ruthless 
exploitation of black energy… No matter how genuine a liberal’s motivations may be, he 
has to accept that, though he did not choose to [it he was]…born into privilege.  
 
Or, as he puts it elsewhere: ‘in the ultimate analysis no white person can escape being 
part of the oppressor camp’ (1978, p. 23).  
 
Racial capitalism and non-integration 
 
While Biko’s critique of white racism is clearly focussed on the South African 
context, it also has, as intimated above, a global resonance. Apartheid represents a 
particularly brutal instantiation of a racist power structure that can be felt elsewhere in 
the world:  
 
[T]he black-white power struggle in South Africa is but a microcosm of the global 
confrontation between the Third World and the rich white nations of the world which is 
manifesting itself in an ever more real manner as the years go by. (Biko, 1978, p. 72) 
 
The South Africa of Biko’s time is thus not so easily separated from the international 
realm; apartheid indexes a worldwide struggle against power of rich white nations. 
Furthermore, this white power structure is typically under-written by capitalism itself: 
‘the colour question in South African politics’ says Biko (1978, pp. 96-97) ‘was 
originally introduced for economic reasons’: 
 
The leaders of the white community had to create some kind of barrier between the 
blacks and whites so that the whites could enjoy privileges at the expense of blacks and 
still feel free to give a moral justification for th[is]…obvious exploitation. 
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While it is true that a class-based analysis took some time to emerge in the Black 
Consciousness movement, anti-capitalist critique did become an increasingly 
important topic in Black Consciousness circles from the mid 1970’s on. There is a 
concomitant shift in language; it is no longer simply the ‘white power structure’ that 
is targeted but, as Badat (2009, p. 63) notes, the ‘white capitalist regime’ and ‘racial 
capitalism’.  
Here it is important to reiterate again that Biko’s critique is of white liberals 
and that, as Budlender (1991) helpfully reiterates, liberalism is the philosophical 
underpinning of capitalism. In his prioritization of what will need to be addressed in a 
post-revolutionary South African society, Biko (1971, p. 2) thus speaks together of 
capitalism and ‘the whole gamut of white value systems’. Or, as Biko’s colleague 
Diliza Mji put it: ‘Apartheid as an exploitative system is part of a bigger whole, 
capitalism’ (cited in Badat, 2009, p. 63). It is for this reason that Mngxitama (2008) 
remarks that whereas anti-racialism produces gestures of integration and de-
categorization – tending to accommodation within existing societal and economic 
structures - true ‘anti-racism seeks to end the world as we know it’ (p. 10).  
 
Narcissistic anti-racism/white heroism 
 
The apparently radical nature of the whiteness-as-terror, autonomy-of-whiteness and 
‘white capital’ themes is thus crucial; it prevents the heroic re-centring of whiteness 
prevalent in many of the more ostentatious forms of white anti-racism. Here one 
might cite the case of how Biko was taken up within the realm of British popular 
culture, questioning how he became something of a white preoccupation. Moving 
away briefly from the South African context, we may attempt here to engage an 
aspect of Biko’s critique of whiteness precisely against the prospect of certain white 
appropriations of Biko.  
In the 1980’s both Peter Gabriel and Simple Minds recorded versions of 
‘Biko’, the anti-apartheid song Gabriel had written about Biko’s death. Gabriel 
performed the song, at Live Aid before an audience of 25 million people. Despite the 
obvious political potential of such an act, it is difficult not to feel a slight sense of 
unease in watching this footage today, in an era where such political anthems are less 
in vogue. It seems harder now to deny that such a performance holds Gabriel himself 
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up to the limelight, securing for the singer and his audience a kind of anti-racist social 
capital. One might adopt a psychoanalytic perspective here, by asking whether such a 
gesture, no matter how well-intentioned – and which certainly can be read as a 
laudable form of consciousness-raising – does not risk tipping over into an instance of 
‘anti-racist narcissism’. We should not be blind to this possibility: that at the very 
moment in which one is fully immersed in publicly applauding the sacrifice, the 
heroism of an other one is simultaneously reaping the rewards of the attention thus 
called onto one’s self. Although he directs his comments at white South Africa, 
Chabani Manganyi’s (1973, p. 17) words nonetheless seem pertinent here: ‘liberalism 
can only be a form of narcissism – a form of white self-love’.  
Important here also is Richard Attenborough’s (1987) Cry Freedom. Although 
the film is ostensibly about Biko, or the relationship between Steve Biko and the 
liberal journalist Donald Woods, it ultimately becomes a story of white heroism. The 
second half of the film is devoted to Woods’ escape from South Africa, and the role 
he plays in alerting the world to the conditions under which Steve died.  The same 
can’t be said about Attenborough’s earlier (1982) film Gandhi. There the point is 
made very didactically that a break must be enforced, that Gandhi must part with one 
of his most trusted English comrades if the anti-colonial struggle was to be brought 
about by Indians themselves. A comparison of these films is revealing. A narrative 
centred on the life of a heroic Indian man and his political struggle is enough to 
sustain Gandhi, to make it both dramatically and commercially viable. The same 
approach does not suffice in Cry Freedom, where the struggle against apartheid must 
be told in the terms of a black-and-white relationship; a white hero, a white 
perspective, must play its part. This is a trope with which we are by now familiar 
with, from John Briley’s (1987) novelistic treatment of the Biko-Woods relationship, 
appropriately sub-titled The story of a friendship, to James Gregory’s account of his 
time as Mandela’s jailer: Goodbye bafana: Nelson Mandela, my prisoner, my friend. 
Returning though to Cry Freedom: the film’s screenplay is heavily reliant on Woods’s 
(1987) Biko; we have thus a kind of Woods-ification of Biko, another contribution to 
the longstanding tradition of whites who make a career out of their involvement in the 
struggle, out of their very anti-racism, their critique of whiteness.  
This is a critique which, quite obviously, I am not immune to. What emerges 
here is the difficult issue of complicity in what one critiques, the prospect, in other 
words, of one’s investment in precisely what one attempts to distance one’s self from. 
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Returning though to the theme of white anti-racist agency: although Biko does not 
explore the topic of white anti-racist heroism in any great detail, he (1978, p. 66) most 
certainly is scornful of the white insistence on maintaining agency and prescribing 
roles for blacks within the anti-apartheid struggle: 
 
Not only have the whites been guilty of being on the offensive, but, by some skilful 
manoeuvres, they have managed to control the response of blacks… Not only have they 
kicked the black but they have also told him how to react to the kick. 
 
He is (1978, p. 20) likewise dismissive of the idea of a shared struggle:  
 
Nowhere is the arrogance of…liberal ideology demonstrated so well as in their insistence 
that the problems of the country be solved by a bilateral approach involving both black 
and white. 
 
We have already identified one mode of a disingenuous white anti-racism: the tactic 
of fetishism whereby one ‘disproves’ one’s racism on the basis of a certain act or 
object. To this tactic we can add two more. Firstly, ostentatious forms of anti-racism 
which function as forms of self-promotion, as paradoxical means of extending white 
narcissism. Secondly, types of anti-racism which enable a re-centring of whiteness, 
aiming to consolidate and extend white agency, typically – although not exclusively - 
through acts of white heroism or self-sacrifice.  
 
White declarations 
 
We are now in a position to introduce Ahmed’s most important argument in her 
critique of whiteness and whiteness studies. Ahmed is interested in admissions of 
racism, whether they take place in the context of institutional declarations of bad 
practice, or in certain styles of confession or apology, in which past historical 
injustices must be spoken out as a precondition of salvaging a particular identity. We 
are witnessing today, as she puts it, a shift towards a ‘politics of declaration’ which 
for many suffices as an adequate gesture of anti-racism.  
Such declarations, for Ahmed (2004, p. 1), involve a fantasy of transcendence 
‘in which ‘what’ is transcended is the very ‘thing’ admitted in the declaration’. In 
basic terms: I admit to my racism so as to exculpate myself from my racism, to prove 
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that I am essentially a well-intentioned non-racist because, after all, proper racists do 
not know that they are racists. Something is thus performed - a confession, an 
apology, an admission - but it is not fully translated into an action, it remains stuck at 
the level of speech-act, this is what Ahmed has in mind with the notion of he non-
performativity of anti-racism. I disagree with her here inasmuch as within the strict 
terms of speech-act theory something is performed here, precisely the performance of 
an avowal, a declaration, an apology – which itself may indeed have some limited 
value – although, and here I certainly do agree with her, it remains in and of itself 
wholly inadequate. 
 I was recently introduced to a convention of vital importance to many 
Australian scholars when discussing aboriginal rights, particularly so in public 
settings. The convention in question is a declarative act, the acknowledgement of 
aboriginal sovereignty in relation to Australian land. Now, as in the case of any 
speech-act, much depends on the contingencies of who is making the statement; how 
it is said; what it is done by saying it (that is, its illocutionary force, its function as a 
speech-act); who it is received by and how; and what set of effects its gives rise to. 
Bearing all of this in mind, and considering also that this is a convention that both 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal Australians adhere to, one may appreciate that this can 
be a meaningful and politically important declaration. Then again, there is also the 
possibility that such a speech-act may be read as – however well-intentioned – an 
exemplary example of a saying but a not doing. In many instances such a concession 
is one by which the declarative subject (say the upwardly mobile, non-aboriginal 
land-owner) never really stands to lose – the land is not presumably going to be given 
back – although they do stand to gain something, namely the status of a politically-
sensitive, penitent subject. All too often – or so it would seem - there is something 
incomplete about such measures, certainly given that they typically fit perfectly with 
existing structures of benefit. One acknowledges the social asymmetries that one has 
benefited from (assuming of course that one is a beneficiary), thus alleviating a 
portion of guilt, whilst continuing to enjoy these privileges indeed, consolidating them 
at a higher level by virtue of one’s awareness, one’s self-reflexive stance. 
 This is the type of critique Ahmed directs at whiteness studies itself, the idea, 
simply put, that by saying I am white, I am somehow not white, or less white because 
of it, the end result of which is that I achieve some distance from whiteness. There are 
interesting parallels to be found in Biko; he points to how white liberals attempt to 
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distinguish themselves from whiteness, to create a pretend difference, a pseudo-
distinction. We have here a similar structure: an appeal to criticality, to an imaginary 
outside position, which allows this subject to win on two fronts. Here it is once again 
worth quoting Biko (1978, pp. 20-22) at length: 
 
[White] liberals, leftists…are the people who argue that they are not responsible for 
white racism…these are the people who say that they have black souls wrapped up in 
white skins… They want to remain in the good books with both the black and the white 
worlds… They vacillate between the two worlds, verbalizing all the complaints of the 
blacks beautifully while skilfully extracting what suits them from the exclusive pool of 
white privileges… [The white liberal] claims complete identification with the blacks… 
[H]e moves around…white circles…with a lighter load, feeling that he is not like the rest 
of the others. Yet at the back of his mind is a constant reminder that he is quite 
comfortable as things stand. 
 
Charitable anti-racism 
 
If we read Biko and Ahmed together we might suggest that today’s version of ‘I am a 
progressive liberal, I am against apartheid’ is ‘I admit how the systematic oppressions 
of apartheid racism benefited me, I am aware of my own latent racism, but I am going 
to give something back’. Let me offer a fictional vignette. A white South African 
colleague returns from abroad after attaining considerable success in his chosen career 
as entrepreneur. His objective is to re-locate to South Africa, to purchase a large area 
of land in a beautiful part of the country, and to fund this by resuming links - long 
since established by his family - to an industry, let us say mining that has been 
founded on long-standing structures of apartheid exploitation. How might such an 
agenda be made viable, especially given the evident contradiction here between the 
perpetuation of historical patterns of racialized privilege, and post-apartheid goals of 
transformation and re-distribution? 
The colleague in question might begin by declaring openly that he has profited 
in multiple ways from an inequitable system but that he now wishes to make amends, 
to contribute in a meaningful way to the country, to participate in processes of 
reconciliation and structural change. This would mean that his involvement in the 
aforementioned industry would need include a charitable dimension and, furthermore, 
an instance of symbolic redress. A limited profit-sharing scheme in which previously 
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disenfranchised workers become part stakeholders would be one prospect here, as 
would the setting up of a trust fund of sorts, a scholarship programme, or an anti-
racism research programme of significance to the organization itself. Such initiatives 
could then, potentially, be converted into social capital; reported upon, disseminated 
in a way that publicizes this ‘proof of change’ as widely as possible. Historical 
privileges of whiteness are thus consolidated; business can go on as usual with the 
added gained of an improved moral standing. The benefits of whiteness can thus be 
converted into the currency of anti-racism. 
This seems a poor basis for transformation, for types of historical redress and 
anti-racism, certainly so inasmuch as they are premised on the promotion of forms of 
white narcissism. What I am referring to as ‘charitable’ instances of anti-racism do 
not result in a levelling of the playing field, in a necessary increase in the equality of 
society, but instead in the affirmation of a different order of privilege. They involve a 
trade-off: the declaration of a past racism – or admission of racialized privilege - is 
offered on condition that the speaker, the agent of the declaration, is able to claim the 
position of the redeemed subject, or gain something by way of liberal social capital. 
It would be false of me to try and distance myself from the ‘giving something 
back’ discourse. It makes for one of the dominant modes of a repentant whiteness 
today, one of the more habitable means of occupying a position of racialized 
privilege. Moreover, I think it is important to signal again the contingency that 
underlies the declarative gestures that Ahmed focuses on. There is as such the 
possibility that such declarations or gestures can be genuine – indeed can be accepted 
in good faith - that they need not always slip back into patterns of pre-existing 
structural privilege. There is not a kind of unconscious hypocrisy behind every 
apology or mode of redress. As Ahmed puts it, ‘The desire for action, or even the 
desire to be seen as the good white anti-racist subject, is not always a form of bad 
faith…it does not necessarily involve the concealment of racism’ (p. 57). There is 
however, a remaining problem, the fact such forms of anti-racism often come to be 
fixed in the mode of charity. 
  
Doing good/Humanitarian violence 
 
I have long been intrigued by Winnicott’s (1949) warning to psychoanalysts that 
granting extra time to their patients is an unconscious expression of hatred. The idea 
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of course being that an aggressive impulse is defended against by means of 
conversion into its opposite. A similar warning can be drawn from Lacan’s (1992) 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis, his injunction there being that one should maintain a 
pronounced distrust of the motivation to do good, to be charitable. Why so? Well, we 
might answer, there is a reiteration of status that follows on from being in a position 
to give; a tremendous symbolic value accords such a position; furthermore, numerous 
ego-gains follow on from the other’s recognition of my goodness. 
Reiterating the role of a benefactor entrenches a subservient position of those 
whom good needs to be done to. The act of charity can be said to create a subject and 
an object, the giver and the ‘object group’ to whom the giving occurs. We have thus 
the generation of a set of reliant and needy subjects, whose status as disempowered is 
affirmed in what we might refer to as ‘the violence of charity’. What we see replicated 
then is a subject-other dynamic not dissimilar to that of racism itself. As in colonial 
racism we have one category of subject who acts, who changes history as an agent, 
and another, to whom things are done, and whom does not acquire the status of an 
able historical agent. As Biko (1978, p. 23) would remind us, we are not far here from 
the assumption that they are the problem: 
 
[Liberals have] the false belief that they are faced with A black problem. There is 
nothing wrong with blacks. The problem is WHITE RACISM and it rests squarely on the 
laps of white society. 
 
I remember some years ago a report in the British media in which an African country 
struck by famine rejected a donation of clothes from a charitable organization, 
complaining that not enough brand labels were included. Rather than succumbing to 
the response that the report was clearly designed to trigger – the angry dismissal of 
these beneficiaries as ingrates - one should see this as a properly ethical gesture. It 
was ethical in a precise sense, in that it brought out the latent aggression contained 
within the charitable act of giving. Put differently, it showed up the relation of gain 
underlying the symbolic pact of charity. This is an object-lesson in how quickly 
charity flips over into aggression, particularly so when what is implicitly requested in 
the act of charity - the recognition of the status, the benevolence of the benefactor - is 
denied. After all, if one is not narcissistically invested in one’s own image as 
benefactor, then what is so offensive about the refusal of the gift? 
 17 
 What proves difficult for white subjects of privilege is not so much the 
injunction to admit one’s privilege, or even to confront one’s own latent racism, but to 
forego both the narcissistic gains in doing so, the symbolic rewards of being 
recognized to have done so. To do the work of anti-racism – and indeed the 
acknowledgement of racism - without the lures of these two kinds of benefit is to 
realize that it is not the task, the prerogative of the privileged to give something to the 
other. It is to realize that there is a certain work of equality and redress, but that it 
doesn’t fall to me to benefit from it, that it is not my prerogative to be the giver, the 
agent of help, of a charitable giving. 
It helps us to be aware of the rewards that accrue to the subject who declares 
their whiteness, their (past) racism, their position of racialized privilege.  Such 
benefits - the rewards of narcissistic gain, of recognition, of symbolic capital – make 
it clear that many instances of anti-racism are more self-serving than they may at first 
appear. Pertinent as these remarks are, do they not set the bar too high in respect of a 
prospective ‘ethics’ of anti-racism? To dissolve the dimensions of narcissism and 
recognition would surely be to dissipate much of the motivation of anti-racism? I 
hope that the falsity of such an argument is by now totally apparent. Anti-racism 
cannot be based on a model of charity; tolerance is not something which can be given. 
This is another point anticipated by Biko: anti-racism cannot be a gift, an act of 
generosity. If it were then there would be a systematic privileging of certain subjects. 
After all, only certain subjects are in the position of being able to covert their racism 
into the currency of anti-racism, to reap thus the redemptive benefits of charitable 
anti-racism. A meaningful anti-racism is not one which remains preoccupied with 
validating, redeeming, or consolidating of the identity the anti-racist subject. It is not 
the project of ameliorating guilt.  
 There is thus good reason to call to a halt gestures of white redemption, to pre-
empt and disenable such enactments of penitence, particularly so if they function to 
re-instantiate images of white exceptionality. This argument is nowhere better stated 
than in Mngxitama’s (2009) response to the question of what should be required from 
whites in response to apartheid’s ongoing legacy of racism. Mngxitama (2009, p. 25) 
comments that “for myself, as a black person, I don’t want: 
 
1. Acknowledgement of whites’ culpability 
2. Disclosure and remorse for what happened during colonialism and apartheid 
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3. I wish for no dialogue 
4. Whites owe me no apology or washing of feet 
5. Please, not another conference on racism 
6. No pledges confirming our collective humanity 
 
Guilt superiority 
  
Before closing, let me respond to a foreseeable criticism. The argument can be made 
that I exemplify each of the critiques I have put forward, that, despite myself, I 
repeatedly enact the failure of my own position. On the one hand there is the charge 
that I fall prey to the tactics of an attempted ‘ex-nomination’ of myself from racism 
and whiteness alike, that I simply repeat at a higher level what I critique, and do so 
via a false separation of myself from various other ‘declarations of whiteness’. This of 
course returns us to the issue raised at the beginning, namely of my own tacit agenda 
in attempting to ‘retrieve Biko’. Aligned to this there is a sense that a narcissistic self-
concern still predominates here, and that it is this – a form of white guilt - that 
ultimately provides the compass of the critique in question.   
A self-redeeming defence is not what is called for here. True enough, such 
arguments as advanced by me (regards declarations of whiteness, the ex-nomination 
of one’s self from racism) perhaps do necessarily fail. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean that the critical agenda of this paper as a whole runs aground if it 
succeeds in showing how declarative instances of apparent anti-racism do not always 
transcend the trappings of narcissistic and symbolic gain. Odd as a conclusion as this 
might seem, the demonstration of such failings, the very fact of their recognition, may 
itself prove an important halfway point in an ongoing project of critique.  
Furthermore – here yet another variation on the overlap of demonstrated self-
critique, narcissism and attempted exculpation – one should remain alive to what is 
typically enabled even through such admissions of failure. There is a type of 
grandiose self-absorption exemplified even in the project of pointing out one’s racist 
failings, a type of ‘heroism of vilification’. As Bruckner (2006) comments, such 
‘noisy stigmatizations only serve to mask the wounded self-love’ (p. 49). We should 
as such be deeply suspicious of politically-correct self-flagellation of this type; for 
Bruckner it provides simply an inverted means of clinging to one’s superiority. 
Racism is by no means bypassed in this way; it is rather re-inscribed at a different 
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level. The extent of white guilt, the enlarged moral responsibility assumed in relation 
to patterns of racialized privilege, these reiterate once again the importance of white 
liberal subjectivity which grows in proportion to the amount of culpability it assumes. 
‘The positive form of the White Man’s Burden (his responsibility for civilizing the 
colonized…) is thus merely replaced by its negative form (the burden of the white 
man’s guilt)’ (Žižek, 2009, p. 114). White guilt that is to say, remains a suspect; if 
linked to politics it remains more often than not a guilt politics aimed at relieving the 
subject’s own discomfort, a political narcissism. 
 
Contrapuntal openings 
 
In what has gone above I made reference above to what might be the wounding of 
whiteness. I also mentioned that the contrapuntal is a means of overlapping different 
territories of experience, a potentially unsettling or destabilizing ‘opening up’. How, 
by way of conclusion, might we link these two ideas? 
Edward Said offers a curious model of cosmopolitan subjectivity. In 
approaching this topic, he considers a far broader realm of cultural insularity than that 
of the white racism and anti-racism we have focussed on. Said is concerned with the 
discomfort of a continually decentred subject, with the fact that  
 
…for even for the most identifiable, the most stubborn communal identity…there are 
inherent limits that prevent it from being fully incorporated into one, and only one 
Identity. (2003, pp. 53-54) 
 
For Said there is ultimately no self-enclosed wholeness of the subject, no security of 
an identity at one with itself. Such forms of anxious decentring in some way 
potentially affect us all, and Said takes them to underlie the generation of a spectrum 
of intolerances and chauvinisms. What thus becomes apparent is that one way of 
understanding the contrapuntal is as a wound, a puncturing of the narcissistic 
enclosure of self-contained identity.  
Said’s description of the difficulties, the pains of cosmopolitanism is 
consonant with this idea. The cosmopolitan for him is not to be understood in the 
terms of sentimental humanism, a beneficent multiculturalism or universal 
brotherliness. By contrast, it is seen as something far more troubling and 
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discomforting, something which holds neither the promise of singularity, nor of any 
“feeling better”. Cosmopolitanism is a lack of closure, a lack of a closure of identity, a 
lack of a closure of cultural insularity. Like a wound that does not heal, cosmopolitan 
subjectivity is a kind of painful remaining open, a refusal to close into one. One might 
link this notion of cosmopolitan subjectivity to psychoanalytic conceptualizations 
such as Klein’s depressive position or Lacan’s ‘subjective destitution’, both of which 
foreclose the possibility of narcissistic wholeness and eschew fantasies of 
transcendence or exceptionalism in favour of something far more fragmented and 
disconcerting. This then is the essence of the cosmopolitan for Said (2003, p. 54), a 
mode of subjectivity which is made possible not through ‘dispensing palliatives such 
as tolerance and compassion’ but by its existence as ‘a troubling, disabling, 
destabilizing…wound’, from which ‘there can be no recovery…no utopian 
reconciliation even within itself’. 
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